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IS COUNTER TERRORISM IN INDONESIA A TRIUMPH?
Angel Damayanti1
Abstract - Banyak pihak memuji keberhasilan pemerintah Indonesia dalam menjalankan strategi
kontra-terorismenya. Keberhasilan ini antara lain ditunjukkan dengan kemampuan Densus 88
menangkap para pelaku peledakan bom, anggota serta pendukung jaringan terroris. Keberhasilan ini
didukung pula dengan kemampuan intelijen nasional Indonesia dalam mengumpulkan informasi.
Keberhasilan lainnya ditandai dengan berkurangnya kuantitas dan kualitas aksi terror. Kendati
demikian, pemerintah Indonesia sejauh ini hanya mampumenangkap teroris dan gagal memberantas
terorisme sampai ke akarnya. Untuk itu, pemerintah perlu mempersiapkan strategi kontra-terorisme
yang komprehensif. Tidak cukup hanya dengan menggunakan pendekatan secara ‘hard’ tetapi juga
harus digabungkan dengan pendekatan secara ‘soft.’ Hal ini berarti perlu melibatkan seluruh
komponen bangsa, mulai dari aparat keamanan, militer, intelijen, departemen-departemen
kementerian terkait, tokoh agama dan masyarakat. Selain itu, strategi ini harus dibuat secara
terpadu dan menyeluruh, mulai dari upaya preventif, penangkapan, rehabilitasi sampai pada
program pengawasan setelah eks-teroris dilepaskan kembali ke masyarakat.
Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, hard approaches, soft approaches, comprehensive strategy.
Introduction
Many terrorist observers have praised of Indonesian government for its counter-
terrorism strategy. Indeed, Sydney Jones mentioned that Indonesia is the best country on
the efforts of counter-terrorism.2 Credit is given to the provision of law and hard counter-
measurements in Indonesia. Supported mainly by the United States (U.S.), Australia and
United Kingdom (UK), the Indonesian police, particularly Special Detachment 88 (Densus
88), have arguably succeeded to arrest terrorists. This affirms that the financial and
logistic supports coupled with training from the U.S. government through U.S. Diplomatic
Security Service, as well as Australian and British authorities, have developed the
capability and professionalism of Densus 88 in countering terrorism in Indonesia.
Nonetheless, there are some critics who are skeptical of this special detachment.
One of these claimed that Densus 88 is only good at conducting counter-terrorist strategy
1 The writer is a lecturer at International Relations Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
Christian University of Indonesia. Email address at ANGEL001@e.ntu.edu.sg or
Angel.Damayanti@uki.ac.id
2 “Pemberantasan Teroris di Indonesia Terbaik,” (The eradication of terrorism in Indonesia is the best),
accessed from http://www.antaranews.com/berita/286992/pemberantasan-teroris-di-indonesia-terbaik,
29 November 2011.
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but not counter-terrorism.3 This suggests that Indonesian police is very capable in
arresting the perpetrators but cannot prevent terrorists from doing their acts nor prevent
the bombing for taking place. Despite its sophisticated weapons and professional
training, Indonesian police continues to miss detection of bombing and consequently the
terrorist attacks continue to occur. This is also confirmed by Ansyaad Mbai, Head of the
Indonesian National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT).4 Since the creation of DKPT
(Coordination Desk for Terrorism Eradication) in 2002, later known as BNPT, and Densus
88 in 2003, Indonesia experienced more than ten times of terrorist acts.5
In fact, the terrorist bombings in Indonesia occur almost every year until 2005.
However, terrorist attack seems to have disappeared between the years 2006 and 2009.
Then, it continues to occur again afterwards. Therefore, this paper will answer the
question of why the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia could not entirely eradicate
terrorism in this country. What factors have caused the efforts of counter-terrorism
authorities to be ineffective? And what should the Indonesian government do to manage
this problem?
This paper argues that the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia is ineffective
mainly due to its partially conducted and not coordinated adequately. There are at least
three factors that resulted in a lack of strategy of counter-terrorism in this country.
Firstly, is the lack of coordination within the Police institutions and with other security-
related apparatus. Secondly, although Indonesian authorities are about to launch the
counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor preventive
strategy. Finally the problem lies in the lack of other agencies and public engagement in
their strategy. These shortcomings cause the Indonesian government to fail to eradicate
terrorism thus.
3 Kumar Ramakrishna, “US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-Terrorist or Counter-Terrorism?” in After
Bali: the Threat of Terrorism Southeast Asia, Kumar Ramakrishna and Tan See Seng (eds), (Singapore:
IDSS, 2003), pp. 305-337.
4 “Densus 88 Andalkan IT Tangkap Teroris” (Densus 88 counts on technology to arrest terrorists),
accessed from http://www.sindonews.com/read/2012/03/08/435/589790/densus-88-andalkan-it-tangkap-
teroris, 8 Maret 2012.
5 Budi Gunawan, Terorisme: Mitos & Konspirasi (Terrorism: Myth & Conspiracy), (Jakarta: Forum Media
Utama, 2006), pp. 114-116. See also “Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000” (Bom Explosions in
Jakarta since 2000), accessed from http://www.kompas.com/lipsus072009/ledakanmegakuningan, 17 Juli
2009.
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To examine the argument, this paper adopts the comparative research method. As
comparative method is to compare particular nations, societies or cultural units,6 this
paper mainly compares the hard approaches of Indonesian government and the soft
approaches carried out by Saudi Arabian government, particularly in conducting counter-
terrorism strategy. The hard approaches carried out by Indonesian government refer to
the security forces that are deployed in eradicating terrorism. The security forces are
profoundly good at counter-terrorist but not counter-terrorism. The police, through
Densus 88, have succeeded to detain more than 600 terror perpetrators, but they cannot
entirely eradicate the terrorism in Indonesia. Therefore, this paper suggests the
Indonesian government to look at the soft counter-terrorism strategy implemented by
Saudi Arabian government.
Essentially, the Indonesian government needs to combine both the hard and soft
approaches in her counter-terrorism strategy. In so doing, the government, through
BNPT, should coordinate all elements of this nation. This includes the security apparatus,
military, intelligent, other related ministries, religious leaders and public to implement a
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. The government should also effectively
implement a holistic and inter-connected strategy. To examine my argument, this paper
will be divided into four sections. First section describes the strategy of countering
terrorism that is carried out in Indonesia. The second section explains the working ways
of Densus 88, which mainly uses hard counter-measurements. The third section examines
the achievements of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia coupled with its
weaknesses. Eventually, this paper examines the challenges faced by counter-terrorism
agencies in Indonesia by looking at the counter-measurements of Saudi Arabian
government.
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia
Every country has its own perception on threats that originate externally and internally.
Accordingly, they need to set up their respective policy to protect their national interest
and homeland security. With regards homeland security, Christopher Bellavita defines it
as a concerted national effort involving the state and local government, combining with
6 W. Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Third Edition,
(Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), p. 402-405.
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the responsibilities of the private sector and individuals to prevent and to protect their
territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against threats, namely
terrorism, man-made and natural hazards, catastrophic events and social trends that may
disrupt their stability. This is in addition to threats against the sovereignty of their state.7
In the case of Indonesia, which is the focus of this article, terrorism is perceived as
one of threats that should be managed. In fact, this country has experienced many
terrorist actions carried out with political and religious purposes. Since its declaration of
independence, Indonesia has encountered insurgent movements, coupled with terrorist
actions that challenge her sovereignty. Among these are Darul Islam (DI), RMS (the
Republic of South Moluccas), PRRI/Permesta and GAM (Aceh Freedom Movement). In
addition, since 1990s the government of Indonesia has to deal with Jemaah Islamiyah
Indonesia (JII) that was originated from DI but are arguably more radical in the sense of
their ideology and methodology.
JII is perceived as a political-religiously driven terrorist group.8 The ideology and
strategy of JII were primarily influenced by Al Qaeda as some cadres of this movement
were trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980. In the training camp, together with the
Afghanistan and Arab Mujahidin, JII’s members gained their ideology in so-called Salafi
Jihadism coupled with military capability. The ideology essentially allowed their followers
to conduct violence and extreme measures to overthrow their government, in achieving
their goals, mainly to establish a Khalifah system and spread Salafi Jihadism to all
Moslems in the world.9 The military training accommodated them with a capability to set
a military strategy and conduct it for achieving their goals.10
After proclaiming his 1996 and 1998 fatwa, Osama Bin Laden personally invited
Sungkar and Ba’asyir, the highest leaders of JII, to visit his sanctuary in Afghanistan and
7 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” in Homeland Security
Affairs, (Vol. IV, No. 2, June, 2008), pp. 1-30.
8 Kumar Ramakrishna, op.cit, p. 305-337. Regarding religion and terrorism see also Bruce Hoffman, Inside
Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 81-130.
9 Mark Stout, “In Search of Salafi Jihadist Strategic Thought: Mining the Words of the Terrorist,” in
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (Vol. 32, No. 10, Sept, 2009) p. 872-892. See also William E. Shepard,
“Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, (Vol. 35, No 4, Nov,
2003), p 521-545 and John C. Zimmerman, “Sayyid Qutb Influence on the 11 September Attacks, in
Terrorism and Political Violence, (Vol. 16, No. 2, 2004), p. 222-252.
10 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI: Salafi Jihadisme di Indonesia (NII to JI: Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia), (Depok:
Komunitas Bambu, 2011), p. 204-207.
Jurnal Pertahanan Mei 2012, Volume 2, Nomor 2 31
asked them to support the ultimate purpose of Al Qaeda.11 This is to fight against the U.S.
and her allies wherever they might be found. Initially, JII applied its strategy to gain public
support and spread Salafi Jihadism thought through their engagement in Poso and
Ambon in the late 1990s as there were religious conflicts in this country. They then
continued their strategy to attack Christians with a series of church bombings in 2000-
2001 and used religion sentiment as its justification.12 However, Al Qaeda’s attack on
World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 ultimately encouraged JII to shift their strategy.
Consequently, JII stopped attacking Christians and started destroying the U.S. and her
allies as well as their interests in Indonesia by bombing iconic targets such as embassies,
hotels, restaurants, cafes, malls, stock exchanges and so forth.13
Although Indonesia has experienced a number of public terrorist actions carried
out by JII since 2000,14 it was the first Bali Bombing in October 2002 that forced the
Indonesian government to include the strategy of the eradication of terrorism in their
national political and security agenda. Initially, the government of Indonesia incorporated
legal measures in their counter-terrorism acts. They published the Government
Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2002 regarding the criminal act of terrorism in accordance
with Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2/2002 regarding the procedures for
protection of victims and witnesses in the heavy human rights violence. Later, these two
regulations become Undang-undang (Law) No. 15/2003 and No. 16/2003. Both laws
essentially define terrorism as a criminal that related to domestic security.15
Consequently, the agency that has ultimate authority to deal with is Indonesian police
11 Bilveer Singh, “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” in Australian Journal of
International Affairs, (Vol. 58, No. 1, March, 2004), p 47-68. See also Solahudin, ibid, p. 247-250.
12 Noorhaidi Hasan, Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity, in Post-New Order Indonesia, (New York:
Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2006), p. 185-206. See also Tjandra Dewi, “Jejak Peledakan Bom di
Indonesia (1998-2002)” (Trace of Bombing Explosions in Indonesia (1998-2002)) accessed from
http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2002/10/21/LU/mbm.20021021.LU81897.id.html, 21 Oktober
2002.
13 “Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000” accessed from
http://www.kompas.com/lipsus072009/ledakanmegakuningan, 17 Juli 2009.
14 See Solahudin, op. cit, p. 256-262. Imam Samudra with his team planned to explode some churches in
Medan, North Sumatra in 28 May 2000. One of the bombs exploded at GKPI Church, the other two
bombs at other churches failed to explode.
15 Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2002, chapter I, article 1 (1), can be accessed from
http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/perpu_1_02.htm
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and subsequently they need to conduct criminal justice process prior to arrest of the
alleged perpetrators.
Further, President Megawati Soekarnoputri instructed the Coordinator Minister of
Political and Security to formulate a set of an integrated and comprehensive policy to
eradicate the crime of terrorism as well as create a non-structural task force unit to
support his duty.16 Accordingly, the Coordinator Minister of Political and Security at that
time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, formed a Coordination Desk in his ministry to
coordinate the terrorism eradication, known as Desk Kordinasi Pemberantasan Terorism
(DKPT), as he launched a decree no. 26/2002 in November 2002. Essentially, this
coordination desk consists of Indonesian police, military and intelligence that should
work together.
The Hard Approaches of Densus 88
Nonetheless, DKPT could not work effectively and cooperatively so that each unit worked
separately. As of 2002, there was a debate regarding the distinctive functions between
Indonesian police and military. It was then suggested that the police should have full
control in the domestic security and law enforcement while the military had to serve the
general national security and defense matters. This also had an impact on counter-
terrorism measures. The simultaneous attacks of terrorist group, coupled with
investigation process of previous attacks, caused the Indonesian police to launch its anti-
terror unit. The decree launched by Chief of Indonesian Police no. 30/VI/2003 justified its
creation. It was later known as Special Detachment 88 of Anti-Terror (Densus 88).17
The creation of Densus 88 was initially funded and trained by the U.S.
government. The U.S. granted about US$ 24 million to form and train this special force in
2003. This is not to mention the training, operational assistance and logistic support from
Australian and British government. As they were primarily trained by the U.S. Secret
Service, CIA and FBI, the capability of Densus 88 is similar to the anti-terror special force
in the U.S. In its development, Densus 88 now has about 400 personnel who have
16 Instruction of President to Coordinator Minister of Political and Security no. 4/2002 can be accessed
from http://hukum.unsrat.ac.id/uu/inpres_4_02.htm
17 Galih Priatmodjo, Densus 88: The Undercover Squad, (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2010), pp. 45-46.
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capabilities in investigation, intelligence, bomb squad, strike forces as well as sniper.18
This is all essential for their operation in capturing bombing perpetrators and terrorist’s
supporters.
One characteristic of Densus 88 is secrecy in their operation so that only the
commandant knows all plans and strategy. To some extent, confidentiality is vital as they
have to raid the terrorists’ sanctuary and catch them without any deterrence. However,
Thomas Quiggin from Centre of Excellence for National Security, Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS) confirms that a globally observed obstacle to good
intelligence on asymmetric threats such as terrorism is the obsession with secrecy. To him
the interactions between the press, the administration and various intelligence
community officials are inevitably. In fact, most of the individuals involved outside
intelligence agencies knew that there was nothing new in the press stories that would aid
terrorists in any way.19
Moreover, secrecy causes security apparatus in other districts and other
authorities to refrain from fully supporting the operations of Densus 88 as
misunderstanding may arise. Consequently, they may not reach an optimal outcome.
Even so, they became victims in some operations due to their lack of information and
coordination. This happened, for example in 2009, when Densus 88 asked the Regional
Police in East Java to support them in carrying out its action to arrest Azhari in Batu, East
Java. The Regional Police had to sterilize the area where Azhari was hiding. By the time of
their action, some members of the Regional Police did not know that they were about to
arrest Azhari. This situation might hamper the operation. Further, Hendropriyono, the
former head of Indonesian intelligence agency, also commented that they could have
arrested Azhari alive and gotten more information from him. It is important for
intelligence task, to request for help and coordinate with another anti-terror squad from
Indonesian army that is more capable.20
In another occasion, three police officers in sector Hamparan Perak, North
Sumatera, were murdered as some terrorists attacked their office in September 2010. The
18 Ibid., p. 50.
19 Thomas Quiggin, Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age, (Singapore: World
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2007), pp 162-164.
20 “Bagus tapi dengan Kritik” (Good but with critics) in Tempo magazine, No. 40/XXXIV/28 November – 4
December 2005.
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perpetrators were allegedly members of the group of Abu Tholut, the leader for JII
military camp in Aceh. Indeed, the terrorists attacked police office as they wished to
revenge against Densus 88 who has previously arrested and shot several terrorists in tacit
raids in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Lampung, near Hamparan Perak. The lack of
information and coordination caused the police officers to be ignorant and unprepared
for terrorist attacks to their office.21 Essentially, the lack of coordination caused the local
authorities and other security agencies, which understand the situation and local
geography as well as ways to conduct a tacit raid better, cannot involve effectively and
optimally.
The Achievement of Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia
Since its creation, Densus 88 has arrested more than 650 perpetrators of terror as well as
killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. According to Tito Karnavian, Deputy of
Enforcement and Nurturing Capabilities of National Agency of Terrorism Eradication
(BNPT), the success of their efforts mainly depends on the role of intelligent combined
with investigation and hard measurements of Densus 88.22 This confirms that the actions
carried out by Densus 88 are strengthened by the capability of intelligence in carrying out
their role. The success of Densus 88 to arrest Amrozi, the first Bali bomber, in less than 4
weeks after the bombing in October 2002 was arguably one of its achievements. From
the arrest, police could then catch Ali Ghufron, Ali Imron, Ali Fauzi and Imam Samudra
several weeks later.
Despite its efforts in arresting a number of perpetrators, Densus 88 remains failed
to prevent the bomb attacks. In reality, they kept occurring. Among such attacks are the
bombings at Mc Donald Restaurant in Makassar, December 2002; Hotel JW Marriot in
Jakarta, August 2003; Australian embassy in Jakarta, January 2004; the second Bali Bomb
in 2005, Hotel JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton in July 2009 and Cirebon Bombing in April 2011.
These are the testimonies of the weaknesses of intelligence capabilities in countering-
21 “Aksi Jaringan Sang Gubernur Militer” (The Action of the Military Governor’s Network) in Tempo
magazine, No. 3931/27 September – 3 October 2010.
22 “Penanganan Terorisme 70% berkat Peran Intelijen” (70% of terrorism handling is due to Intelligence)
accessed from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/11/08/03/lpcank-penanganan-
terorisme-70-persen-berkat-peran-intelijen, 3 Agustus 2011.
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terrorism as mentioned by former head of Densus 88, Suryadarma Salim.23 This is in
addition to the weaknesses of law enforcement regarding intelligence as acknowledged
by Ansyad Mbaai.24
However, the decrease in numbers of terrorism actions lately, in terms of both
quality and quantity, coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence Law recently, show
the strengthening and development of the role and capability of intelligence institution.
The law remains debatable and the capability still needs to be proven. Yet, it justifies the
intelligent acts. Therefore, this paper suggests that the problem of counter-terrorism
strategy in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence per se but mainly in the preventive
program. The police is still lacking in surveillance, although the counter-terrorism
agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to prevent further attacks by
predicting as well as collecting information of the potential bombings such as those
which happened in Bali last March,25 and the government is about to launch counter-
terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures.26 Their failure lies in the preventing the
spread of the Jihadist ideology, which justifies the use of violence to achieve their goals.
Amongst Southeast Asia countries, Indonesia suffered the most from JII attacks.
This is because JII originated from Darul Islam that aimed to establish Indonesian Islamic
State.27 Although this movement was defeated when Indonesian government executed
the leader, Kartosuwirjo, in 1962, his ideology was still embraced and developed by his
followers, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. Both of them were Yemeni
23 “Kemampuan Intelijen Indonesia Memprihatinkan” (The capability of Indonesian intelligence is a
concern”) accessed from http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/76874-
_kemampuan_intelijen_indonesia_memprihatinkan, 22 Juli 2009.
24 “Ansyad Mbaai, Peredam Glombang Radikalisme” (Ansyad Mbaai, The Absorber of Radicalism Wave)
accessed from http://www.intelijen.co.id/wawancara/1313-ansyaad-mbai-peredam-gelombang-
radikalisme, 15 Agustus 2011.
25 “Polri: Jaringan Teroris Hendak Rampok Toko Emas Money Changer di Bali” (Indonesian Police: Terrorist
Network is about to steal Jewelry shop and money changer in Bali)
http://us.news.detik.com/read/2012/03/18/233400/1870431/10/polri-jaringan-teroris-hendak-rampok-toko-
emas-money-changer-di-bali?nd992203605, 18 Maret 2011.
26 “Counter-Terrorism Get Legal Boost,” accessed from
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/18/counterterrorism-get-legal-boost.html, 18 Januari 2012.
27 Greg Fealy, “Half a Century of Violent Jihad in Indonesia: A Historical and Ideological comparison of
Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (eds.) Islamic Terrorism
in Indonesia: Myths and Realities, (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2005), pp. 15-32.
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descendants, used to be committees of Al Isryad, which is one of modernist movements
in Indonesia, and later became founder of JII.28
Sungkar and Baasyir coupled with their cadres had spread the ideology of Salafi
Jihadism in Indonesia through dakwah (preaching) either in the Mosque or in their cell
groups meeting. They also published ‘Jihadist’ books and built pesantrens and madrasah
(Islamic schools) with their ideology.29 In accordance with their strategy, JII has ultimately
introduced the ideology and to gain sympathy and support from the public. The latter
comprises financial support, logistic and human resources. Consequently, it is difficult to
predict how much of this ideology has spread and influenced the people, mainly in rural
areas in West and Central Java, as this region used to be a base for DI.
Although the government, through BNPT, has conducted de-radicalization
program to detainees30 and seminars to prevent the radicalism in universities,31 it cannot
entirely stop the terrorism acts so far. To some extent the program is also rejected by
Islamic movements, including Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) in Solo.32 The government
may use the ex-jihadists and ulamas to de-radicalize the terrorists. However the acts of
terrorists keep on occurring. This is not to say that the de-radicalize program run by the
government fails. Yet, the government misses the point.
The Future Challenges of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Indonesia
As mentioned earlier, a homeland security strategy involves a concerted national effort of
state and local government who act in accordance with private sector and individuals.
Similarly, Rohan Gunaratna confirms that to effectively combat the very current
terrorism, the governmental, inter-governmental and societal response must conduct a
28 Solahudin, op. cit, pp. 65-77. See also Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror,
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 125-128 and Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical
Islamism in Indonesia, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), pp. 48-50.
29 Solahudin, op.cit., pp 240-245.
30 Tito Carnavian ‘Terrorist Rehabilitation: Indonesia’s Experience,” in Report on International Conference
on Terrorist Rehabilition, Singapore: RSIS and RRG, 24-26 February 2009.
31 “Kerjasama BNPT – Perguruan Tinggi Dorong Aparat Intelijen Masuk” (Cooperation between BNPT and
Universities encouraged intelligent agency to enter campuses” http://www.intelijen.co.id/warta/1654-
kerjasama-bnpt-perguruan-tinggi-dorong-aparat-intelijen-masuk-kampus, 22 Desember 2011.
32 “5 Ormas Islam tolak proyek deradikalisasi eks teroris” (5 Islamic movements reject de-radicalization to
ex-terrorists) accessed from http://us.news.detik.com/read/2011/12/19/100222/1794200/10/5-ormas-islam-
tolak-proyek-deradikalisasi-eks-teroris, 19 Desember 2011.
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comprehensive strategy.33 This implies, firstly, that terrorism cannot be managed solely
by hard approaches but needs soft approaches. This also suggests that all elements of a
nation should cooperate to protect their national interest and internal security,
particularly in dealing with terrorism. Eventually, for an effective counter-terrorism
measurement, government must conduct a holistic and interconnected action against
terrorist groups at all stages, from the pre-formative to the post-destruction phase.
So far, the Indonesian government has conducted two approaches of counter-
terrorism strategy. In addition to Densus 88, the Indonesian government has also formed
a national agency, namely BNPT, to eradicate terrorism in a ‘softer’ way. The government
accommodated this agency with President Decree No. 46/2010 regarding the creation of
BNPT and its tasks. As mentioned in the decree, BNPT is primarily in charge to formulate a
policy, strategy and program in eradication of terrorism, which includes prevention,
protection, and de-radicalization. Therefore, this paper suggests the Indonesian
government to look at the “soft” counter-terrorism strategy carried out by the Saudi
government. It is called ‘soft’ as the Saudi government involves other ministries rather
than merely security forces. Christopher Boucek, in his paper, explains the three
interconnected programs of counter-terrorism strategy that is aimed at prevention,
rehabilitation and aftercare.34
In so doing, the Indonesian government should activate all her resources. This
ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, intelligent
agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The other ministries
that are needed in this program involve education, religion, psychological, social and
economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in conducting detention of terrorists,
prevention of the spread of the ideology, rehabilitation of the detainees and after
rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-jihadist in re-entering the society.
In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of
Education who runs a lecture and program throughout schools from a very basic to
33 Rohan Gunaratna, “Introduction: Change or Continuity?” in The Changing Face of Terrorism, (Singapore:
Eastern University Press, 2004), pp. 1-17.
34 Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy,” in Carnegie Papers, Middle East
Program, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 97, September 2008), pp.
1-25. See also Rohan Gunaratna, “De-radicalization Programs around the World”, in Combating Terrorism
in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration, March 2010, pp. 7-8.
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university levels as the majority of the extremists in Indonesia are young people. This
program contains education and warning about the dangers of extremism as well as the
impact of terrorism and violence. This also promotes nationalism that will prevent any
violence that is based on religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of “unity
in diversity”. Further, in particular events, the government may distribute books,
pamphlets and other materials regarding the program to enlighten students’ parents and
families. The government and schools should also take some steps to combat recruitment
and deployment of the radical ideology within the school. This usually comes from
deviant teachers or senior students who exploit their time with students by discussing
issues out of their courses such as politics as well as religions and subsequently spread
hatred.
Ministry of Religions should also run the same program in pesantrens and
madrasahs (Islamic schools). Moreover, they need to supervise books and other materials
that are used in these schools and take a decisive action on Salafi Jihadists books. This is
especially important as the police have just found books about conducting jihad in
Tangerang, West Java.35 In addition, they need to engage respected and moderate
Ulamas to spread the non-violence ideology such as loving, caring and peace of Islam
through dakwah (preaching). They may also involve the ex-jihadists, such as Nassir Abas
to join this program and share their experience.
As for the rehabilitation process, BNPT should cooperate with religious clerics and
scholars coupled with psychologists and social researchers, and hold dialogues with
arrested perpetrators after the completion of interrogation phase. The clerics should
apply the dialogue in a close and conducive way, so that the prisoners may feel that they
are being humanized and thus communicate openly. The government should also engage
ex-JII members who have higher authorities and are more respected by the other
members, so they may be heard by detainees.36 Once the higher ranking JII members
change their worldview, as an outcome of this communication, it will provide greater
35 “Police found ‘jihad’ books and explosive powder in raided house,” accessed from
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/03/30/police-found-jihad-books-and-explosive-powder-
raided-house.html, 30 Maret 2012.
36 Hasibullah Satrawi, “Deradikalisasi Berbasis Ideologi,” (Deradicalization based on Ideology) accessed
from http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/10/29/03584393/Deradikalisasi.Berbasis.Ideologi, 29 Oktober
2011.
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opportunity to other members to respect and follow his instruction. Further, the
psychological and social division is responsible to determine what support to give to the
prisoners and their families who may need help during and after release to society.
Similarly, the clerics should remain in contact with the ex-prisoners so the former jihadists
may continue to study with the ulamas,who were counseling them in prison.
In the aftercare program, the Indonesian government needs to facilitate the lives
of the detainee when he returns back into life in society. The government may put them
into a specialized rehabilitation care center for a certain time prior to their return to a
‘normal’ life. This also provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether to release a
candidate. The government should also provide skill training and job opportunities to ex-
jihadists so that they can be productive to support themselves and their family, and be
accepted by the society. This will reduce the possibility of going back to their former
groups. The provision of job opportunity applies to preventive actions as well. The access
to a better economy and education will essentially reduce the possibility of terrorist
recruitments.
In addition, there is a growing trend for Islamic radical groups to utilize social
media to spread their ideology and recruit their potential cadres. They also share the
same grievances about a corrupt and injustice government, which is the foundation to
their ideology.37 Therefore, role of Ministry of Communication is needed here to supervise
the activities in social media. Moreover, law enforcement together with wholeheartedly
efforts to increase the social and economic welfare as well as education arguably reduces
the concern of potential supporters and sympathizers.
All of these programs ultimately are carried out as a holistic and interconnected
strategy. The conduct of this strategy certainly needs cooperation and coordination from
all elements of this nation. As mentioned in President’s decree, BNPT will take
responsibility for this. This effort may face challenges as it is not easy to coordinate all
programs, needs a greater budget, takes a longer term38 and deals with Indonesian
37 Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin, “Social Media and Terrorism in Indonesia:
Enhancing or Diluting its Appeal?” in RSIS Commentaries no. 051/2012, 22 March 2012.
38 Kumar Ramakrishna, op. cit.
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democracy political system.39 However, with a strong political willingness from
government, involvement of all state’s elements and inter-governmental cooperation,
a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which essentially pays respect to the law
and human rights, may prevail.
Conclusion
Despite its lack of coordination, Densus 88 has arguably succeeded to raid the terrorists’
safe house, arrest the bombing perpetrators and, to some extent, prevent the upcoming
attacks. Yet the government fails to eradicate terrorist group’s ideology, so called Salafi
Jihadism, which is the foundation of their actions, and prevent the spread of it. Therefore,
it is essential for all elements of this nation to cooperate in stopping and countering
terrorism. The Indonesian government should put an effort to carry out soft counter-
terrorism, as carried out by Saudi government, which interconnects prevention,
rehabilitation and aftercare program. This effort should be combined with the hard
counter-measurement of Densus 88. Consequently, BNPT should coordinate not only
among the security agencies but also the related Ministries, local authorities as well as
public which are involved in the program. Essentially, in this reform era, the Indonesian
government should conduct a holistic and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy and
this is in such way to respect the law and human rights of Indonesia.
39 Syahdatul Kahfi, “Memberantas Terorisme, Menjaga Konsolidasi Demokrasi: Sebuah Dilema?” (The
eradication of terrorism and protection of democracy is a dilemma?) in Terorisme di tengah Arus Global
Demokrasi (Jakarta: The Circle for Contemporary Political Studies, 2006), pp. 277-287. See also Kofi
Annan, “A Global Strategy in Fighting Terrorism,” accessed from http://english.safe-
democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html , 10 Maret 2005.
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